Merely possible explanation by GUIGON, GHISLAIN
Merely possible explanation
GHISLAIN GUIGON
eidos – The Genevan Centre for Metaphysics, Department of Philosophy,
University of Geneva, 1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland
e-mail: Ghislain.Guigon@unige.ch
Abstract: Graham Oppy has argued that possible explanation entails explanation
in order to object to Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss’s new cosmological argument
that it does not improve upon familiar cosmological arguments. Gale and Pruss, as
well as Pruss individually, have granted Oppy’s inference from possible explanation
to explanation and argue that this inference provides a reason to believe that the
strong principle of suﬃcient reason is true. In this article, I shall undermine Oppy’s
objection to the new cosmological argument by arguing that it is logically possible
that some truths are merely possibly explained.
Graham Oppy1 objects to Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss’s new cos-
mological argument2 that it does not improve upon traditional cosmological ar-
guments because the weak principle of suﬃcient reason invoked in the former
entails the strong principle of suﬃcient reason invoked in the latter.
Let the strong principle of suﬃcient reason be the following:3
S-PSR For every proposition p, if p is true then there is an explanation
for p.
The weaker principle of suﬃcient reason Gale and Pruss appeal to is the
following:
W-PSR For every proposition p, if p is true then it is possible that there
is an explanation for p.
Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss, as well as Pruss individually,4 grant the infer-
ence from theW-PSR to the S-PSR and claim that this inference provides a further
reason to believe that the S-PSR is true.
In this article I shall argue that the W-PSR does not entail the S-PSR. I shall ﬁrst
argue that an ancillary assumption for the derivation from the W-PSR to the
S-PSR, namely the assumption that explanation is dissective, is aﬃrmed in the
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absence of good grounds. Then I shall argue that there is a good reason to deny
that explanation is dissective. If it is sound, my reasoning shows that it is logically
possible for some truths to be merely possibly explained and undermines one of
the main objections against the new cosmological argument.
Oppy’s inference
Gale and Pruss’s new cosmological argument relies on the following
deﬁnitions and assumptions:
Deﬁnition 1 : A possible world is a maximal compossible conjunction
of abstract propositions.
Deﬁnition 2 : The big conjunctive fact (BCF) for a possible world is
the conjunction of all the propositions that would
be true if the world were actual.
Deﬁnition 3 The big conjunctive contingent fact (BCCF) for a
possible world is the conjunction of all of the
contingent propositions that would be true if the world
were actual.
Assumption 1 For any proposition p and any world w, the BCF
for w either contains p, or the negation of p,
but not both.
Assumption 2 For any proposition p and any world w, if p is in w’s
BCF, then there is some world w* and proposition q
such that p and q are in w*’s BCF, and q explains p
(the W-PSR given deﬁnition 1 of a world).
Then the argument runs as follows:
(1) If p1 is the BCCF for a world w1, and p2 is the BCCF for a world w2, and
p1=p2, then w1=w2. [by deﬁnition 1 and deﬁnition 3]
(2) @ is the BCCF of the actual world. [deﬁnition]
(3) For any proposition p and any world w, if p is inw’s BCF, then there is
some world w* and proposition q such that p and q are in w*’s BCF,
and q explains p. [the W-PSR]
(4) (Hence) there is a possible world wk and a proposition # such that the
BCF for wk contains @ and #, and the proposition that # explains
@. [from 2 and 3]
(5) wk=the actual world. [from 1, deﬁnition 1, deﬁnition 2, and
assumption 1]
(6) (Hence) in the actual world, there is a proposition # such that the
BCF for the actual world contains @, #, and the proposition that #
explains @.
360 GHI S LA IN GUIGON
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412510000168
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:15:15, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
Gale and Pruss argue further that # has to be a contingent proposition that reports
the free intentional action of a necessary being.
Oppy objects to the new cosmological argument is that the W-PSR entails the
S-PSR and that since we have good reasons to reject the S-PSR, we have good
reasons to reject the W-PSR.5 Oppy’s derivation from the W-PSR to the S-PSR
parallels the Fitch derivation, which is the derivation from the veriﬁcationist
premise:
K1 For every p, if p is true then it is possible to know that p.
to
K2 For every p, if p is true then someone knows that p.
Brieﬂy, the Fitch derivation runs as follows. Suppose that K1 is true and K2 is
false. By the negation of K2 there is some proposition q such that q is true and no
one knows that q. Substitute the proposition (q and no one knows that q) for p in
K1. Then, by modus ponens, we can infer that it is possible that someone knows
that (q and no-one knows that q). Yet the latter is absurd provided we accept that
knowledge is dissective:
DK For any propositions p and q, if someone knows that p & q, then
someone knows that p and someone knows that q.
For by DK we get the absurd result that it is possible that (some x knows that q
and there is no x who knows that q). Therefore, on the assumption that DK is
valid, if K1 is true so is K2.
Which reasons are there to believe that DK is true on the assumption that K2 is
false? The answer is trivial : it is impossible for a given knower to know a con-
junction and fail to know each of its conjuncts. Thus, DK is motivated by the
following stronger claim:
SDK For any propositions p and q and for any x, if x knows that p & q,
then x knows that p and x knows that q.
Oppy’s derivation from the W-PSR to the S-PSR is a reductio that is complete on
the presence of the following ancillary assumption about explanation that par-
allels DK:
DE For any propositions p and q, if there is an explanation for p & q,
then there is an explanation for p and there is an explanation
for q.6
Thus, that explanation is dissective.
Oppy’s reductio runs as follows. Suppose that the W-PSR is true and that the
S-PSR is false. If the S-PSR is false, then there is a proposition q such that q is true
and there is no explanation for q. Substitute ‘q and there is no explanation
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for q ’ for p in the W-PSR. Then, by modus ponens, we can infer that it is
possible that there is an explanation for (q and there is no explanation for q).
By DE we can derive that it is possible that (there is an explanation for q and
there is an explanation for there being no explanation for q). By the further
principle that explanation is veridical – i.e. the undeniable claim that prop-
ositions having a true explanation are themselves true – we can infer that it is
possible that (there is an explanation for q and there is no explanation for q),
which is absurd.
Oppy claims that DE is plausible.7 But which reasons are there to believe that
DE is true? DE is trivially true on the assumption that the S-PSR is true. But since
in the derivation from the W-PSR to the S-PSR we are assuming that the S-PSR is
false, the S-PSR cannot be the motivation for DE here.
Some may suggest that the justiﬁcation for DE is the claim that explanation is
closed under entailment, i.e. the claim that, necessarily, for any p, q, and r, if q is
an explanation for p and p entails r, then q is an explanation for r. But someone
who, like Oppy, rejects the S-PSR would be well advised to deny that explanation
is closed under entailment. For suppose that p is a true proposition such that q
explains p, and suppose that r is a logical necessity that has no explanation. Since
r is a logical necessity, p entails p & r. Then, if explanation is closed under en-
tailment, q explains p & r. And if DE, which follows from the assumption that
explanation is closed under entailment, is true, it follows that q explains r.
Contradiction!
In order to avoid the contradiction, we must either maintain that no prop-
osition has an explanation or maintain that every logical necessity has an expla-
nation. But scientiﬁc nihilism, i.e. the claim that no truth has an explanation, is
highly implausible. And, although both claims are not inconsistent, the con-
junction of the claim that every logical necessity has an explanation and of the
negation of the S-PSR is unappealing. For, since they are true no matter what,
logical necessities are among the best candidates for being unexplained truths. So
someone who, like Oppy, rejects the S-PSR should better reject the claim that
explanation is closed under entailment.
Therefore, on the assumption that the S-PSR is false and given that Oppy’s
derivation is inspired by the Fitch derivation, the most plausible motivation for
DE is the following parallel to SDK:
SDE For any propositions p, q, and r, if r explains that p & q, then
r explains that p and r explains that q.
However, I shall argue that SDE – contrary to SDK – plausibly fails. If I am right
and if it is true that SDE is the most plausible motivation for DE in the absence of
the S-PSR, then DE is ill motivated and there is no good reason to believe that the
S-PSR follows from the W-PSR.8
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Explanations for conjunctive truths
First, what do we mean by ‘explanation’ in the context of a cosmological
argument? Gale and Pruss contend that they can conceive of only two sorts of
explanation: personal and scientiﬁc; where a personal explanation is a prop-
osition that reports the intentional action of an agent, and a scientiﬁc explanation
is a conjunction of law-like propositions, be they deterministic or only statistical,
and of a proposition that reports the occurrence of some event.9
Since the view that causation occurs in virtue of the instantiation of dispo-
sitional properties seems to me prima facie plausible, I will also take into account
the possibility of an explanation that is a conjunction of law-like propositions, be
they deterministic or only statistical, and of a proposition that reports the in-
stantiation of a dispositional property by some entity. However, in order to sim-
plify the exposition I will omit reference to law-like propositions in what follows
and assume that these constitute the background conditions for any explanation
that is not personal. Therefore, I will assume that an explanation is either a
proposition that reports the intentional action of an agent, or a proposition that
reports the occurrence of an event (given some law-like conditions), or a prop-
osition that reports the instantiation of some dispositional property by some
entity (given some law-like conditions).
Now the relevant question when evaluating SDE is: what explains conjunctions
of contingent truths? I shall consider four plausible alternatives:
(i) For any event or action C, if the occurrence of C changes a state of the
world in which p & q is false into a state of the world in which p & q is
true, then the proposition that reports the occurrence of C explains
that p & q.
(ii) For any disposition C and entity e, if the manifestation of C by e
changes a state of the world in which p & q is false into one in which p
& q is true, then the proposition that reports that e instantiates C
explains that p & q.
(iii) For any events or actions C and D, if (a) the occurrence of C changes
a state of the world in which p is false into a state of the world in
which p is true and (b) the occurrence of D changes a state of
the world in which q is false into one in which q is true, then the
conjunction of the propositions that report the occurrence of C and
the occurrence of D explains that p & q.
(iv) For any dispositions C and D and entities e and f, if (a) the
manifestation of C by e changes a state of the world in which p is false
into a state of the world in which p is true and (b) the manifestation
of D by f changes a state of the world in which q is false into one in
which q is true, then the conjunction of the propositions that report
that e instantiates C and that f instantiates D explains that p & q.
Merely possible explanation 363
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412510000168
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:15:15, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
Each of (i)–(iv) is a plausible claim about the explanation of conjunctions of
contingent truths. Importantly, neither of (i) and (ii) implies that each of p and q
has an explanation, whereas each of (iii) and (iv) implies that each of p and q has
an explanation. So plausibly any failure of DE, if there is any, is a situation in
which either (i) or (ii) holds. In the last section of this article, I exhibit such a
plausible failure of DE.
However, I shall ﬁrst argue that if either (i) or (ii) is the case, SDE is clearly
false. Then I shall argue that if either (iii) or (iv) is the case, we should reject
SDE.
Plausible failures of SDE
Suppose that I am giving a talk at a conference, that there is a bottle on the
table in front of me, placed there by the organizer, and that I have a glass in my
hand. Then, by placing the glass on the table I change a state of the world in
which it is false that there is a bottle and a glass on the table into a state of the
world in which it is true that there is a bottle and a glass on the table. Therefore, if
(i) is the case, the proposition that I placed a glass on the table (together with
some law-like propositions) explains that there is a bottle and a glass on the table.
Yet it cannot be true that the proposition that I placed a glass on the table ex-
plains that there is a bottle on the table since the latter was true before I acted.
Therefore, if (i) is the case, SDE is clearly false.
A similar reasoning shows that SDE fails if (ii) is the case. Suppose that the glass
in front of me is broken and I have some opium in my hand. By taking the dose of
opium I have in my hand I drift into sleep. In other words, my drifting into sleep is
a manifestation of the soporiﬁc disposition of the dose of opium I had in my
hand. My drifting into sleep changes a state of the world in which it is false that
the glass is broken and I am asleep into a state of the world in which it is true that
the glass is broken and I am asleep. By (ii), the proposition that the dose of opium
I had in my hand is soporiﬁc (together with some law-like propositions) explains
that the glass is broken and I am asleep. By SDE the proposition that the dose of
opium I had in my hand is soporiﬁc explains that the glass is broken. Yet it cannot
be true that the proposition that the dose of opium I had in my hand is soporiﬁc
explains that the glass is broken since the latter was true before the dose of opium
I had in my hand manifested its soporiﬁc disposition. Therefore, if (ii) is the case,
SDE clearly fails.
Now I wish to argue that if (iii) is true, SDE should be rejected. In order to do so,
I shall ﬁrst argue that if (iii) is the case, SDE fails according to a popular theory of
causation, namely the counterfactual theory of causation. Following David Lewis,
many contemporary philosophers account for causation in terms of counter-
factual dependence. Roughly, if C is a cause of E, then if C were not to occur E
would not occur. And so, if q is the causal explanation for p, then if q were not
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true – if the event or action reported by q were not to occur – p would not be true.
I shall argue that, given (iii), SDE conﬂicts with the counterfactual analysis of
causation.
Suppose that the organizer of the conference placed a bottle on the table and I,
the speaker, placed a glass (and no bottle) on the table. Then, according to (iii),
the proposition that the organizer placed a bottle on the table and I placed a
glass on the table explains that there is a bottle and a glass on the table. By SDE,
the proposition that the organizer placed a bottle on the table and I placed a
glass on the table explains that there is a bottle on the table. However, the prop-
osition that there is a bottle on the table does not counterfactually depend on
the proposition that the organizer placed a bottle on the table and I placed a
glass on the table. For suppose that I placed no glass on the table though the
organizer placed a bottle on the table. Then, it is true that there is a bottle on the
table but false that the organizer placed a bottle on the table and I placed a glass
on the table. So, given (iii), SDE conﬂicts with the counterfactual analysis of
causation.
Somemight object that the displayed situation is a counter-example to the bare
bones counterfactual analysis of causation instead of a counter-example to SDE.
For it is well known that there are situations in which the eﬀect does not coun-
terfactually depend on its cause; these are cases of so-called causal pre-emption.10
Consider the following example of late pre-emption:
Assassin and Badgirl both put poison in Victim’s coﬀee, which he
drinks at noon. Assassin uses a fast-acting poison that kills within
one hour. Badgirl uses a slow-acting poison that takes from one to
two hours to kill. At 1.00 pm, Victim is dead. If only Badgirl had
administered the poison, Victim would have been alive at 1.00 pm,
but dead by 2.00 pm.11
Intuitively, Assassin’s action is a cause of Victim’s death while Badgirl’s action is
not. If so, the proposition that Assassin puts poison in Victim’s coﬀee explains
that Victim is dead at 2.00 pm. However, the proposition that Victim is dead at
2.00 pm counterfactually depends neither on the proposition that Assassin puts
poison in Victim’s coﬀee nor on the proposition that Badgirl puts poison in
Victim’s coﬀee.
But there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between cases of pre-emption and the
situation with the bottle and the glass. That Assassin puts poison in Victim’s
coﬀee causally grounds that Victim is dead at 2.00 pm. In other words, Victim is
dead at 2.00 pm because of, in virtue of, Assassin’s action. However, it cannot be
true that there is a bottle on the table because the organizer placed a bottle on the
table and I placed a glass on the table, or so I shall argue. Then, since a causal
explanation is intended as describing what causally grounds the truth of the
proposition that reports the eﬀect, it cannot be true that the proposition that the
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organizer placed a bottle on the table and I placed a glass on the table explains
that there is a bottle on the table.
People working on the logic of grounding usually endorse the following claims
as axiomatic or derived (where ‘the ps’, ‘ the qs’, and ‘the rs’ are plural variables
denoting either one or more propositions):12
Grounding for conjunction For every p and q, p and q together ground
that p & q (where it is assumed that some propositions together ground a
further one if and only if each of the former helps grounding the latter).
Transitivity For every ps, qs, and rs, if the ps ground the qs and the qs
ground the rs, then the ps ground the rs.
Grounding for conjunction is motivated by the claim that a conjunction is true in
virtue of the truth of its conjuncts. Transitivity is motivated by the claim that if, in
order to be true, some proposition(s) require(s) the truth of some proposition(s)
which itself/themselves require(s) some further proposition(s) to be true in order
to be true, then the former proposition(s) require(s) the latter proposition(s) to be
true in order to be true.
By grounding for conjunction, the proposition that the organizer placed a bottle
on the table and the proposition that I placed a glass on the table (together)
ground that the organizer placed a bottle on the table and I placed a glass on the
table. Let us assume for the sake of the argument that (iii) and SDE are both true
in such a way that that the organizer placed a bottle on the table and I placed a
glass on the table (causally) grounds that there is a bottle on the table. By tran-
sitivity, the proposition that the organizer placed a bottle on the table and the
proposition that I placed a glass on the table (together) ground that there is a
bottle on the table. However, there is no way the proposition that I placed a glass
on the table can have helped grounding that there is a bottle on the table since the
bottle was there before I acted. Hence, we should deny that the proposition that
the organizer placed a bottle on the table and I placed a glass on the table explains
that there is a bottle on the table. If (iii) is true, SDE should be rejected.
Finally, I shall argue that if (iv) is the case, SDE should be denied. Suppose
that the manifestation of the fragility of the glass changes a state of the world
in which it is false that the glass in front of me is broken into one in which it is
true that it is broken, and suppose that the manifestation of the soporiﬁc dispo-
sition of the opium I had in my hand changes a state of the world in which it is
false that I am asleep into one in which it is true that I am asleep. By (iv) the
proposition that the glass is fragile and the opium I had in my hand is soporiﬁc
explains that the glass is broken and I am asleep. By SDE the proposition that the
glass is fragile and the opium I had in my hand is soporiﬁc explains that the glass
is broken.
But even in a dispositionalist context, a causal explanation is intended as de-
scribing what causally grounds the truth of the proposition that reports the eﬀect.
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Since, by grounding for conjunction, the proposition that the glass is fragile
and the proposition that the opium I had in my hand is soporiﬁc (together)
ground that the glass is fragile and the opium I had in my hand is soporiﬁc,
then by transitivity, (iv), and SDE the proposition that the glass is fragile and
the proposition that the opium I had in my hand is soporiﬁc (together) ground
that the glass is broken. However, there is no way that the soporiﬁc disposition
of the opium I had in my hand can have helped grounding that the glass is
broken since the glass was broken before the dose of opium manifested its dis-
position.
Plausible failures of DE
So far I have argued that if either (i) or (ii) is true, then SDE clearly fails,
and I have argued that if either (iii) or (iv) is the case, SDE should be rejected.
Since each of (i)–(iv) is a plausible candidate account of the explanation of con-
junctions of contingent truths, we must conclude that SDE plausibly fails. Then
since SDE is the most plausible motivation for DE and since SDE plausibly fails,
we must conclude that there is no good reason to believe that DE is true. But are
there good reasons to believe that DE is false on the assumption that the S-PSR is
false? I think so.
It seems to me that among the reasons why people tend to believe that DE is
true is the false belief that any explanation for a conjunction is somehow in-
complete if one of its conjuncts remains unexplained. It is the belief that for any
propositions p and q if there is an explanation for p but no explanation for q, then
something must be added to the explanation for p in order to get an explanation
for p & q. This belief is justiﬁed if q is such that its truth requires an explanation,
but it is misguided if q is a truth that requires no explanation.
As I emphasized when discussing whether explanation is closed under entail-
ment, logical necessities are among the best candidates for being unexplained
truths since they are true no matter what. Logical necessities do not only seem to
be true in the absence of any explanation, they also seem to be such that their
truth requires no explanation (where for any p, p requires an explanation for its
truth if, and only if, there is a set x of propositions such that, for any world w, if p
is true inw, then somemember of x is true inw and explains p inw). For instance,
the proposition that if 2+2=5, then 2+2=5 seems true independently of any
explanation.
Now suppose that the proposition that there is a glass on the table requires an
explanation in order to be true, and that its actual explanation is the proposition
that I placed a glass on the table. Then, the proposition that I placed a glass on the
table contributes to the explanation of the proposition that there is a glass on the
table, and if 2+2=5, then 2+2=5. For my placing a glass on the table changes a
state of the world in which it is false that there is a glass on the table and if 2+2=5
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then 2+2=5, into a state of the world in which it is true that there is a glass on the
table and if 2+2=5, then 2+2=5.
Moreover, assuming that the proposition that if 2+2=5, then 2+2=5 requires
no explanation for its truth, the proposition that I placed a glass on the table
clearly suﬃces to explain that there is a glass on the table and if 2+2=5, then
2+2=5. In other words, once I have explained why there is a glass on the table,
nothing needs to be added to explain why there is a glass on the table and if
2+2=5, then 2+2=5.
Finally, since the proposition that I placed a glass on the table contributes to
the explanation of the proposition that there is a glass on the table and if 2+2=5,
then 2+2=5, and since its contribution to the explanation of this conjunction
suﬃces to explain it, we must conclude that the proposition that I placed a glass
on the table fully explains that there is a glass on the table and if 2+2=5, then
2+2=5. If so, the proposition that there is a glass on the table and if 2+2=5, then
2+2=5 has an explanation, even if one of its conjuncts has no explanation.13
Therefore, we are justiﬁed in rejecting DE on the grounds that some proposition
requires no explanation for its truth.
Let me emphasize that nothing essential in the latter course of reasoning relies
onmy appeal to a logical necessity. What matters here is that one of the conjuncts
requires no explanation in order to be true. On the assumption that the S-PSR is
false, there is a proposition that is true and has no explanation. Then, since it
follows from the above-mentioned deﬁnition of a proposition that requires an
explanation for its truth, that every truth that lacks an explanation is a proposition
that requires no explanation for its truth, substituting any proposition that lacks
an explanation for the proposition that if 2+2=5, then 2+2=5 in the previous
course of reasoning yields the same conclusion: namely, that we are justiﬁed in
rejecting DE.
Importantly, the aﬃrmation that truths that lack an explanation are prop-
ositions that require no explanation for their truth helps to make more plausible
the central thesis of this article, that is, the thesis that it is logically possible that
some truths are merely possibly explained. For if the W-PSR is true, the S-PSR is
false, and DE is false, then there is an unexplained truth q such that in some
possible world w there is an explanation for (q and there is no explanation for q)
without there being an explanation for q. Yet, as an anonymous referee for
Religious Studies rightly pointed out to me, we might legitimately wonder what
an explanation for (q and there is no explanation for q) could be if it does
not explain q. As s/he suggested to me, the most plausible explanation for
(q and there is no explanation for q) is an explanation of why there is no ex-
planation for q ; yet it is unclear how an explanation for there being no expla-
nation for q could explain that (q and there is no explanation for q). However, we
gain clarity once we consider that q must be a proposition that requires no ex-
planation for its truth since q is true in the actual world but has no explanation in
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the actual world. It is because q requires no explanation for its truth that ex-
plaining why there is no explanation for q suﬃces to explain the whole con-
junction.14
Since DE is aﬃrmed in the absence of compelling grounds and since there is a
good reason to deny DE on the assumption that the S-PSR is false, the reductio
from the W-PSR to the S-PSR is not complete and the claim that the W-PSR
entails the S-PSR is unjustiﬁed and plausibly false. If so, and since Oppy’s main
objection against the new cosmological argument is not conclusive, the new
cosmological argument is signiﬁcantly distinct from traditional arguments in-
volving the S-PSR.15
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